O NE OF the most successful religious books of our time has been Hans Küng's On Being a Christian.
THE STARTING POINT
The starting point for Christology is the real earthly Christ. As Küng puts it, "Would it not perhaps correspond more to the New Testament evidence and to modern man's historical way of thinking if he started out like the first disciples from the real human being Jesus, his historical message and manifestation, his life and fate, his historical reality and historical activity, and then ask about the relationship of this human being Jesus to God, about his unity with the Father." 5 With this proposition of Kiing's I am in hearty agreement. In fact, I would say that Küng is here following the actual journey by which Christology necessarily arose. All human reflection on the mission and nature of any person begins with that person's historical activity. All abstract generalizations about persons inevitably go back to concrete experiences of these persons, either by oneself or by others. Hence, when our generalizations about individuals lose contact with concrete experience, they are invalidated.
Further, previously enunciated theory cannot be well appropriated unless the new appropriator partakes in some way of the experience that gave it birth. Hence students of abstract physics learn the great theories by participating in experiments that enable them to share in the process by which the theories originated. So, too, later Christians must come to grips with the concrete life of Christ if they are to grasp in a vital way his mission and person. The dogmatic assertions of Christology were the end result of a process of prayerful reflection on the life of the earthly Christ in the light of the experience of his risen presence and power. For those who went through the process, these assertions had the living meaning that a summary statement has for the man or woman who makes the summary after going through the detail which underlies it. These assertions were seen to be abstractions, summary presentations of that which was far vaster; hence they gave birth to an existential realization that they were incomplete. One implicitly knew that one could and had to return to the data in order to come up with new answers to new questions. 5 * Perhaps the greatest weakness of the manual Christology was that it deprived those who learned it of the process of discovery. Students each of the four sections of this paper were submitted to Küng in order to make certain that they faithfully rendered his thought. He was kind enough to read them through and to suggest a few minor additions and subtractions. I have incorporated all these suggestions into the summaries. I am grateful to him for his assistance. 5 On Being a Christian 133. 5a St. Thomas seems to exemplify this process. His systematic Christology in the Summa theologiae was preceded by the prayerful reflections on the Gospels manifested in his commentaries. Further, within his systematizing the concrete mysteries of Christ's life found an important place. learned immediately the summary enunciations of the Church, but they did not realize existentially that these were but a summary. They lacked rooting in the concrete Christ, since the proof-texts which supported the summary were often wrenched out of the living context of Christ's life. They did not see a need to return constantly to the life of Christ for further light on who he was, what he said and did, and what he demanded of his followers. The doctrine of the Church tended to become a dead abstraction; it should have been a partial summary of the concrete activity of a person which continuously awakened the memory of that person and drove students to discover further aspects of the demands he made upon them as the varied paths of their own lives provoked new questions.
In that Hans Küng has so vigorously insisted on beginning his Christology with the real earthly Christ, he has strengthened a movement that has been taking shape in Roman Catholic circles. He has made next to impossible the return to an arid doctrine of Christ that starts with abstract propositions. For this he deserves our gratitude.
THE REAL CHRIST
This real Christ can be partially uncovered with reasonable certitude by modern Scripture scholars. They cannot give us a chronological biography, but they can furnish us with the drives, patterns, and values which characterized the earthly Christ and which are normative for us. Küng tells vis: "The stories of Jesus lead us to ask for his real history; not indeed for a continuous biography, but certainly for what really happened. Despite all the difficulties, the preconditions for such an investigation have become easier. This is the result of the modern historical-critical method"* Küng goes on to reveal the shortcomings of past views of Christ: the Christ of piety, of dogma, of the enthusiasts, and of literature.
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Then he sets forth the sources for a better view 8 and proceeds to elaborate at length the basic traits of Jesus Christ, his activity and preaching. 9 The fundamental insight which sums up all else for Küng with regard to Jesus isthat He asserts a completely underived, supremely personal authority. He is not merely an expert or a specialist, like the priests and theologians, but one whowithout appealing to any source or argument for his authority-on his own account proclaims in word and deed God's will (»man's well-being), identifies himself with God's cause (»man's cause), is wholly devoted to this cause and thus, without any claim to title or authority, becomes the supremely personal public advocate of God and man. 
The Interpretative Venture
1) There is a concrete history that is lived which is prior to the history that is recounted. That lived history in all its concreteness is the ultimate ground of all the history that is written. Each historian must make use of the tools which permit him or her to contact these lived events that ground all history. And so the concrete words and deeds of the earthly Christ constitute the indispensable source of any historical account of his life. In turn, that historical account alone can be the initial basis of any genuine Christology and soteriology, since we can come to an understanding of the mission and person of Christ (as of every historical human being we know) only through knowing what he said and did.
2) History as lived in its full concreteness is forever beyond the grasp of any single historian or group of historians. This is so because any concrete reality has so many facets and can be viewed from so many perspectives that its intelligibility can never be exhausted. Thus, in my window is a flower box. At first glance one might think that in a few moments one could exhaustively recount all that might be said about the dirt in the box. However, one discovers that one can keep asking more and more questions and keep coming up with more and more answers. 
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Applying these considerations to Christ, we can understand better John's notion that all the books in the world could not contain his whole life.
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If the total grasp of a pile of dirt or of a flower is not possible, how can we expect one historian or even all the historians who ever lived to grasp completely the man who was Jesus Christ?
3) Hence all perceptions, understandings, and communications regarding any concrete reality-even those by eyewitnesses-are necessarily partial. They may be true or false answers to the implicit questions asked by the witnesses; but because they are answers to a limited set of questions, these perceptions, understandings, and communications are inevitably interpretations, partial views of concrete reality. With regard to Christ, this means that every account of his activity, whether true or false, is an interpretation. The Fathers, the councils, and the scholastic theologians have given us only interpretations. Moreover, even the NT writers and before them the original witnesses possessed, and were able to pass on, not the concrete reality of Christ but only their limited interpretations. AU these views are necessarily interpretations, because the intelligibility of concrete reality is so vast and the possibilities of any human intellect are so limited that a total uninterpreted grasp of any reality is impossible. 4) While it is true that all historians depend ultimately on accounts and monuments that go back to the events studied, good historical method does not assume that the first interpretation, that of the eyewitnesses to an event or events, is ipso facto the best and most normative interpretation. This is a commonplace of modern historians, but it may be worthwhile to give their reasons for it.
First of all, the later interpreter or historian often has the benefit of the accounts of many eyewitnesses; and he can use these accounts to check one another and to formulate a more comprehensive view of what really happened. Thus, the detective who interviews all the witnesses may have a better view of the crime than any single eyewitness; and a reader of four accounts of the events of Jesus' earthly life may know better what happened than a man who witnessed these events and wrote one of the accounts.
Secondly, the historian has the advantage of examining the past events from a perspective which became possible only after those events.
30 He knows what happened subsequently, and he can better grasp what was significant and what was not significant for the future in the prior events. Thus, the historian of a war can grasp with hindsight that a given battle constituted the turning point of the struggle, although those present at the battle could in no way appreciate that fact. Similarly, the first Christians who accompanied Christ were able in the light of the Resurrection to grasp the significance of his life and death in a manner that was impossible when they accompanied him on his journeys.
Thirdly, the future historian has the immense advantage of benefiting from the advance in human understanding and sensitization that occurs with the passing of time. The knowledge of man is cumulative; what one generation discovers tends to become the habitual knowledge of the next generation; and when knowledge becomes habitual, it sensitizes its possessor to such an extent that he or she sees what the nonsensitized miss completely. Thus, the psychological discoveries of the last generation have passed into the habitual knowledge of many a present-day college student. And so that student is sensitized to such things as defense mechanisms, operant conditioning, and Freudian slips. Consequently, the modern student who reads accounts of activities of the past can easily detect manifestations of these operations even though the generation that wrote the accounts had no notion of them at all. Similarly, the historian whose mind has been expanded by the growth of the social sciences after the events he recounts is able to envision a history of far greater breadth and depth than the history recorded by the original witnesses. And so, whereas the historians of the past wrote history largely Lonergan, Method in Theology 192.
in terms of political institutions, the expanded modern mind now realizes that ideas, economic forces, social structures, and a host of other factors have been at work in shaping the past. Accordingly, the history viewed through these perspectives is far more comprehensive and normative than the fragmented history written by eyewitnesses with limited viewpoints.
Fourthly, a similar expansion of viewpoint occurs when a person who witnesses a series of events tries to live out the ideals the events encourage. To hear a master when one is starting out is one thing; however, once one begins to live out what he taught, one finds that one understands in a far deeper way the meaning of what he said and lived. Lived experience changes a person and allows him or her to appreciate as never before what had been witnessed in the blindness that characterizes the tyro and the initiate. And so the first disciples of Jesus missed much of what he said and did; they were truly blind. It was the searing effect of the Passion and Resurrection and their living-out of the paschal faith that opened their eyes to see on a thousand roads to Emmaus what they had missed on the one road to Calvary.
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The list of factors making for a more comprehensive view on the part of the later historian could be lengthened. But I have said enough. Note, however, that my main point is not that eyewitnesses are wrong and subsequent interpreters are right. Instead, the basic point is that later interpreters have opportunities that enable them to ask more and better questions, questions that never occurred to the eyewitnesses. Thus, it is conceivable that the first companions of Jesus would have asked such questions as "Is he the Messiah?" or "Is he the Prophet?" It is inconceivable that they would have asked "Is he the Son of God?" or "Did he exist from all eternity?" These last are ultimate questions, questions that could be formulated only after the passage of time had allowed for a development of Christian experience and reflection on the fruits of that experience. 32 They are not questions that were answered negatively by the eyewitnesses and positively by subsequent interpreters. They were not asked by the eyewitnesses at all. Their minds lacked the expansion that would have made the questions possible.
Summary Critique of Küng's View
Hans Küng believes that the real earthly Christ who confronted the original witnesses is the norm of Christology. I concede that the earthly Secondly, I disagree with Küng's elevation of the interpretation of the original witnesses (which, as we have seen, he confuses with the grasp of the real Christ) to the status of the norm to which all other Christological interpretations must conform. According to the critical method practiced by historians in most fields today, initial interpretations tend to be narrow and limited, whereas later interpretations tend to reflect a more comprehensive perspective. Accordingly, it seems unreasonable to subject later interpretations to an initial interpretation.
Thirdly, Küng's view supposes that all that can be said about the earthly Christ as norm was said by one group of interpreters. I believe that this is a variation of a recurring tendency in Christian theology to identify God's revelation of Himself with some limited understanding of that revelation. This tendency was evidenced in those who held that all revelation was in Scripture, or in some select part of Scripture, or in a certain group of Christians. Küng's variation locates revelation in the first interpretations of the earthly Christ. My view is that the concrete Christ was and is the locus of revelation, that all views of Christ are interpretations and hence partial, that later interpretations from broader and deeper perspectives are always possible, and that no one interpretation can be so comprehensive that all subsequent interpretations must fall within its perspectives. This is not to deny that Scripture is a norm that subsequent interpretations may not contradict. It is to assert the possibility of later interpretations which go beyond the interpretations of Scripture without contradicting them. Ultimately it is to assert the possibility of a genuine development of doctrine, a development which is not merely a restatement in other language of what was once stated by the first interpreters. already known in some vague way. However, genuine human development of understanding is characterized by stages of successively higher viewpoints and perspectives with the emergence of new questions. The adult is not the child writ large, and adult understanding of childhood is not just the logical expansion of the child's understanding of the same childhood. Similarly, advances in physics and chemistry do not occur because later scientists draw out the logical conclusions of the findings of earlier scientists; rather, they occur because the dynamic nature of persons provokes the emergence of higher viewpoints and more comprehensive perspectives in which new questions are asked of the old data and new answers given. Accordingly, Küng's view, which would restrict normative development to a prolongation of the findings of the perspective of the initial witnesses, misconstrues the dynamic cognitional process which is at the base of the development of human understanding in all other fields of knowledge.
THE RESURRECTION
The Resurrection is Christ's reception into a new and glorified life by the Father. 37 The basic function of the Resurrection is to attest that the cause of Christ, the pattern of his life, truly did manifest in its totality the work of God.
38 Küng believes that there is a risen Christ who lives forever with the Father. For him, the Resurrection is not just a myth that expresses an enduring general truth in legendary form. Resurrection speaks of a reality beyond historical verification, but of a reality nonetheless. 39 That reality was experienced by the early Christians in the Resurrection appearances; and it is these experiences, and not a simple pondering over Jesus' words and deeds, which gave rise to the Resurrection faith. 40 Küng's understanding of (a) the historical-critical method, (6) the meaning of the Resurrection, and (c) the nature of legitimate doctrinal development conditions all his judgments upon teachings that have emerged and are still emerging in the Roman Catholic tradition. 57 I believe that the sooner we recognize that these are the three issues that affect all the rest, the better we will be in a position to dialogue reasonably with him on particular issues. 57 To avoid undue complexity, I have not treated other effects that flow from Küng's basic views. E.g., it seems that his lack of stress on the new and vital power of the continuing presence of the risen Lord accounts for his failure to grapple with the problem reflected in such notions as extra ecclesiam nulla salus and "anonymous Christian." These concepts were framed to confront a real difficulty. If one acknowledges that Christ has become universal Lord and Savior through his death and resurrection, and if one agrees that nonChristians can be saved, then one must postulate that all who are saved, Christians and non-Christians, have some real relationship to Christ. Christians have an explicitly grasped relationship. Non-Christians must also have some real relationship to him even though they do not explicitly recognize him. This can be possible only if his risen presence in power allows him to "touch" them even without their knowing it, just as the force of gravity from the sun and the stars "touched" people for centuries without their knowing it. In attempting to explain how the living Christ constituted the possibility of salvation for those who do not explicitly recognize him, Christian theology devised such concepts as "anonymous Christian" and extra ecclesiam nulla salus. I would agree with Küng's rejection of these notions (89-98); for, although they reflect a genuine understanding of our tradition, they do so in terms and concepts that are unnecessarily offensive to non-Christians. However, the problem they attempt to meet remains.
Küng does not meet the problem. He asserts the elements that lead to it: that Christ is universal Savior ( 
